Trinidad and Tobago's police service acquired approximately 1,000 body cameras. For Carnival 2026, only 180 were operational. The remaining 820 were not broken, lost, or obsolete. They were rendered useless because the Police Service halted a multimillion-dollar international licensing contract that the cameras require to function.
Body cameras are not standalone devices. They depend on cloud storage, data management software, and licensing agreements that allow the footage to be securely stored, retrieved, and used as evidence. Without the licensing contract, the cameras are hardware without purpose.
Commissioner Guevarro attributed the halt to decisions made under the previous administration. Former Commissioner Griffith disputed the characterisation. Attorney General Jeremie said he did not know the programme's status.
Why This Matters Now
The body camera issue surfaced during the Senate debate on the ZOSO bill in January 2026. The Independent senators made body cameras a condition of their support. Their logic was straightforward: if the government wants expanded police powers in designated zones, the public needs assurance that those powers are being exercised lawfully. Body cameras provide that assurance.
The government rejected the condition. The Senate rejected the bill. The government declared a State of Emergency instead - which provides broader powers than ZOSO, nationwide, without body cameras.
Police are now conducting arrests, searches, and detentions under SoE powers across Trinidad and Tobago. The devices that could verify whether those powers are being exercised appropriately sit in storage, 82% non-functional.
The Procurement Question
The full history of the body camera procurement has not been published. The total cost - acquisition, installation, training, licensing - is not in the public domain. Who made the decision to halt the licensing contract, and under what rationale, has not been explained.
These are not trivial questions. A "multimillion-dollar international licensing contract" is a significant expenditure that went through a procurement process, was approved by someone in the chain of command, and was then stopped by someone else. Both the approval and the halt are decisions with paper trails.
The AG's statement that he does not know the programme's status is itself notable. The Attorney General is the government's chief legal officer. The legal admissibility of body camera footage is directly within his portfolio. Not knowing whether the programme that produces that footage is functional suggests the issue has not been prioritised at the cabinet level.
The Regional Comparison
Jamaica and Barbados have both implemented police body camera programmes. A comparison of their rollouts - procurement process, licensing models, operational rates, footage usage in court - would provide a benchmark for what a functional programme looks like.
That comparison has not been conducted, at least not publicly. Trinidad and Tobago's programme exists in an information vacuum: cameras bought, licensing halted, 82% non-functional, nobody responsible, nobody investigating.
What the 180 Cameras Tell Us
The 180 cameras that are operational work because their licensing was maintained. This means the infrastructure exists - the cameras function, the software works, the storage is available. The problem is not technical. It is administrative and financial.
Restoring the remaining 820 cameras to operational status would require reactivating or replacing the licensing contract. The cost, relative to the original "multimillion-dollar" figure, would likely be a fraction of the initial procurement.
In a country under SoE, with expanded police powers, facing documented concerns about police conduct, the argument for operational body cameras is not complicated. The barriers to making them operational are not technical. The question is why nobody has acted.
The 180 cameras that work are proof the programme can function. The 820 that do not are proof that someone decided it should not.